Economic growth creates demand for foreign workers, not the other way around.
On the primary direction of causation, Abela is supported by the Maltese chronology — which is exactly what our earlier fact-check (#312) found when it tested the opposite claim. The sequence ran jobs-first: Maltese unemployment fell sharply from 6.4% in 2013 to around 4% by 2017, and female labour-force participation climbed from roughly 50% to the mid-60s, before foreign-worker inflows accelerated meaningfully. The foreign-born share then took off specifically from about 2017, once the domestic labour supply (Maltese unemployed plus newly-activated women) was largely tapped out. That ordering — demand pull first, migration response second — is the demand-led-migration pattern Abela describes. What stops this being a clean True is the absolute 'not the other way around'. Once migrant workers arrive they expand the labour supply, which in turn enables further output, more consumption, and additional growth — a well-documented feedback loop. So growth leading is the correct first-order story, but the relationship is two-way at the margin, not strictly one-directional. The directional claim holds; the categorical exclusion of any reverse effect overstates.
On the primary direction of causation, Abela is supported by the Maltese chronology — which is exactly what our earlier fact-check (#312) found when it tested the opposite claim. The sequence ran jobs-first: Maltese unemployment fell sharply from 6.4% in 2013 to around 4% by 2017, and female labour-force participation climbed from roughly 50% to the mid-60s, before foreign-worker inflows accelerated meaningfully. The foreign-born share then took off specifically from about 2017, once the domestic labour supply (Maltese unemployed plus newly-activated women) was largely tapped out. That ordering — demand pull first, migration response second — is the demand-led-migration pattern Abela describes. What stops this being a clean True is the absolute 'not the other way around'. Once migrant workers arrive they expand the labour supply, which in turn enables further output, more consumption, and additional growth — a well-documented feedback loop. So growth leading is the correct first-order story, but the relationship is two-way at the margin, not strictly one-directional. The directional claim holds; the categorical exclusion of any reverse effect overstates.
We tested Abela's claim against the chronology established in companion fact-check #312, drawn from Eurostat unemployment (une_rt_a), 20-64 female employment (lfsi_emp_a) and foreign-born population share (migr_pop3ctb), 2013-2024, plus Central Bank of Malta labour-market analysis. The methodological question is whether economic growth led and migration followed (Abela's framing) or whether the causation also runs the other way.
Verdict lands at Mostly True because the first-order direction Abela asserts is the one the data support: domestic unemployment fell and female participation rose before foreign-worker inflows accelerated, and the foreign-born share rose specifically once domestic supply was exhausted around 2017 — i.e. migration responded to a demand pull from growth. This is the inverse of the 'migration drives the GDP numbers' framing that #312 rated Misleading. The reason it is not a full True is the word 'not the other way around': migrant labour supply, once present, itself enables further growth, so the relationship is bidirectional at the margin even if growth leads. Abela's primary causal story is right; the absolute denial of any feedback is the overreach, which is why the deep-dive keeps the verdict at Mostly True rather than True.
Does economic growth really drive demand for foreign workers
On the main point — which came first — Abela is on the right side of the evidence. The Maltese chronology runs jobs-first: domestic unemployment fell and women were drawn into work before foreign-worker inflows accelerated, and the foreign share took off only once that domestic labour supply was largely used up. That is the demand-led pattern he describes, and it is the mirror image of the "migration is what's producing the GDP numbers" claim our earlier fact-check (#312) rated Misleading. Where Abela overreaches is the absolute "not the other way around": once migrant workers are here, their labour also enables further growth, so the link is two-way at the margin even if growth leads.
The sequence in the data
If migration were driving growth, you would expect the foreign-worker inflow to come first and the labour-market tightening to follow. The Maltese data show the opposite ordering. Maltese unemployment was already falling hard — from 6.4% in 2013 toward 4% by 2017 — and female labour-force participation was climbing from around 50% before the foreign-born share began its steep climb. By the time migration accelerated, the domestic labour supply was close to exhausted.
Read together, the two lines tell the demand-led story: the economy ran out of domestic workers (unemployment at a floor, women already activated) and only then pulled in foreign labour at scale. Migration responded to the demand that growth created — which is precisely Abela's claim.
Why it is not a clean "not the other way around"
The qualifier that keeps this from a full True is the absolute second half. Causation in a small open economy like Malta's is not purely one-directional. Once foreign workers arrive, they enlarge the labour force, fill vacancies that would otherwise cap output, spend in the local economy, and thereby enable further growth. Economists describe this as a feedback loop: growth pulls in labour, and that labour supply in turn supports more growth. So "growth creates demand for foreign workers" is the correct leading direction, but "not the other way around" denies a real, if secondary, reverse effect. The relationship is two-way at the margin.
So is the claim accurate?
Mostly. The chronology supports Abela's primary point — Maltese unemployment fell and domestic participation rose before foreign-worker inflows accelerated, so migration responded to demand created by growth, not the reverse. That is the same finding our earlier check reached from the other side. The overreach is the categorical "not the other way around": migrant labour, once present, also feeds back into growth. The leading direction is right; the absolute exclusion of any reverse effect is the part that softens the verdict.
Verdict: Mostly True.