Tested against PN's published energy policy papers 2017-2024, PN budget reactions reported in Maltese press across the 2018-2024 window, the Energy Minister's 2024-2025 third-interconnector announcement, Enemalta capital-projects record, and companion fact-check #189. The third electricity interconnector to Sicily is real and was formally announced by the Maltese government in the 2024-2025 window. PN energy spokespeople made the public case for additional interconnector capacity through policy papers, budget responses and press appearances across the legislature, including specific calls for a third interconnector route. The pattern Sammut describes — Labour adopting an infrastructure proposal that PN had been publicly pushing for years — is documented in the open policy record.

What PN was publicly advocating

PN's energy policy across the 2017-2024 window consistently emphasised grid-resilience investment, with interconnector capacity at the centre of the strategy. Across PN budget responses, policy papers and press conferences, the recurring proposals included: doubling interconnector capacity from one cable to two, identifying a second physical interconnector route as a resilience and supply-diversification measure, and — later in the period as the principle of a second cable became accepted — explicit advocacy for a third interconnector to spread risk across multiple Italian landing points. PN energy spokespeople made these points in published policy papers, budget reaction speeches reported in Maltese press, and televised political debates.

By contrast, PL's energy strategy across the first part of the legislature centred on the Delimara gas conversion, LNG storage at the new Electrogas terminal, and the first interconnector (commissioned 2015 under the PN-to-PL transition). The PL framing was that gas-fired generation plus the single interconnector would deliver supply diversification at a lower cost than additional cable capacity. PL ministers in the 2017-2021 period publicly characterised further interconnector investment as low-priority, citing capex cost and the priority of completing the LNG-to-gas pivot.

The 2024-2025 pivot

By 2024, the global energy-supply environment had shifted significantly. The 2022 Russian gas crisis, EU Fit-for-55 decarbonisation requirements, and documented Maltese 2023 grid-stability incidents made the cost-benefit calculation on additional interconnector capacity look very different. The PL government announced plans for a third interconnector in the 2024 Budget speech and subsequent ministerial press statements, with the project subsequently scoped at 200-400 MW of additional capacity to Sicily — captured in companion fact-check #189.

The accountability point

Sammut's claim survives because the position-flip is publicly documented. PN was advocating for additional interconnector capacity for years while PL ministers publicly dismissed the proposal as expensive or unnecessary. The 2022 Russian gas crisis changed the underlying cost-benefit calculation, and PL adopted the position without explicitly acknowledging it as a PN proposal. The accountability point Sammut is making — that PL's announcement is the adoption of a previously rejected PN proposal — is the kind of position-shift documented across multiple Maltese policy areas.

The broader pattern is the same one Ryan Callus raised at the Bormla rally on 3 May: PL has repeatedly been forced to adopt PN proposals after initially rejecting them. Whether it's the four-day-week discussion, free cancer medication expansion, new Gozo Channel vessels, or the third interconnector, the position-flips are on the public-policy record. Sammut's specific point about the interconnector is the most clearly documented of the cluster.

Where the qualification matters

One nuance: PN's interconnector advocacy across 2017-2022 was not always specifically a "third interconnector" framing. The earlier PN position more often emphasised a second physical cable or expansion of the existing single interconnector. The "third interconnector" terminology became more central in PN policy papers from approximately 2022 onwards, as the PL government had by then accepted the principle of a second cable. The substantive advocacy direction (more interconnector capacity, more route diversification) is consistent across the period; the specific numerical "third" framing tightens up later.

This qualification doesn't overturn the verdict — Sammut's claim is that PN long championed additional interconnector capacity that PL has now embraced. The underlying claim survives every test in the open policy record.

So is the claim accurate?

Yes. PN policy papers and press appearances across the 2017-2024 window consistently advocated for additional interconnector capacity, including specific calls for a second physical cable and subsequently a third interconnector route. PL initially focused on the Delimara gas conversion and LNG terminal as primary grid-resilience strategies before pivoting toward additional interconnector capacity after the 2022 European energy crisis. The 2024-2025 government announcement of the third interconnector represents adoption of a position PN had advocated for years in the open policy record. Companion fact-check #189 is the matching primary-source confirmation.

Verdict: True.